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2000] THE SUPREME COURT- LEAD! NG CASES 
ID. FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
A. Federal Preemption of State Law
339 
1. Preemption of State Common Law. - Preemption is probably
the most frequently used constitutional doctrine in practice. 1 It is the 
doctrine by which Congress supersedes state law and establishes uni­
form federal regulatory schemes to ensure the smooth functioning of 
the national economy. The Supreme Court, in an effort to cabin this 
immense congressional power, has traditionally applied a "presumption 
against preemption" - a rule of statutory interpretation under which 
federal law does not preempt state police powers absent clear congres­
sional intent. 2 The presumption has recently fallen into some disfavor, 
however, and the Court has ignored it in some prominent preemption 
cases.3 It remains viable, but its vitality is now in question. Last 
Term, in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,4 the Court once again 
chose to disregard the presumption, holding that a Federal Motor Ve­
hicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) preempted state tort claims against 
manufacturers who failed to install airbags.5 Consistent with recent 
preemption precedent, Geier signals the Court's subtle drift away from 
the presumption against preemption in favor of a more functional fed­
eral law preference rule. In so doing, the Court revealed its concern 
81 See Laidlaw, r20 S. Ct. at 704-00; cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,579 (r992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]his is not a case where it is 
reasonable to assume that the affiants will be using the sites on a regular basis .... "). 
82 Laidlaw, uo S. Ct. at 706 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564).
83 Se.e id. (finding an injuzy in fact based on plaintiffs' response to Laidlaw's "illegal" (as de­
fined by Congress), though apparently unhannful, conduct). 
84 See id. (stating that the congressional determination that civil penalties may deter future 
violations "warrants judicial attention and respect''· 
1 Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELLL. REV. 767, 768 (1994).
2 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947). Tbe presumption, however, is not
necessarily applicable in areas of traditional federal involvement, such as waterways. See, e.g., 
United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. IIJS, II43 (2000). 
3 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 290-303 (2000). 
4 120 S. Ct. 19r3 (2000). 
S Id. at r928. 
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regarding the systemic, national effects of state law and exhibited a
preference in the commercial sphere for uniformity, certainty, and
technical expertise.
In 1992, Alexis Geier was seriously injured when her 1987 Honda
Accord crashed into a tree.6 Although the car was equipped with
shoulder and lap belts, which Geier had duly fastened, it lacked an
airbag. 7 Geier subsequently sued Honda in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, alleging that Honda had negligently and defec-
tively designed the Accord without an airbag.8 The district court dis-
missed the suit, holding that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act9 preempted Geier's state common law tort claim.
10 The
court concluded that FMVSS 2o8,11 promulgated by the Department
of Transportation (DOT) under the Act, made airbag placement discre-
tionary for auto manufacturers in 19872 Geier's tort claim, which
would have made airbags mandatory, attempted to set a standard not
identical to the federal standard
13 and was therefore preempted.
14
The D.C. Circuit affirmed.'" The court of appeals, however, re-
jected the district court's analysis in light of the Act's "saving" clause,
which explicitly states that compliance with federal safety standards
does "not exempt any person from any liability under common law.'
16
Instead, the court found that the Act impliedly preempted Geier's
claim because her claim would have presented an "obstacle" to the
federal policy that favored a gradual phase-in of passive restraints.1
7
The Supreme Court affirmed, following the D.C. Circuit's reason-
ing. 18 Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer' 9 first held that to harmo-
nize the Act's preemption clause and saving clause, it was necessary to
6 Id. at 1917.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Pub. L. No. 89-563,80 Stat. 720(1966) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30127 (I994)).
10 Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1917.
11 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962, 29,009-10 (July 17, 1984).
12 Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1916-17. FMVSS 208 did not make airbags entirely optional, but instead
required that manufacturers install passive restraints in ten percent of their fleets as part of a
"gradual phase-in." Id. at 1924 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. 28,999-29,000 (July 17,
1984)). Honda had complied with this standard. Id. at 1916-17.
13 See 49 U.S.C. § 301o3(b) (I994) (recodification of 15 U.S.C. § 13 9 2(d) (1988)).
14 Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1917.
Is Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3 d 1236, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
16 Id. at 1238 (quoting i5 U.S.C. § 13 97(k) (i988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (i994))
(internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 1240-41.
17 Id. at 1242-43.
Is Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1925, 1928. Geier resolved a split that rested definitively along "federal
versus state" lines. Five federal circuit courts had found preemption, while several state supreme
courts had not. Id. at 1917.
19 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Breyer's
opinion.
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read the Act to preempt only positive state statutes and regulations,
and not common law tort actions.2 0 Any other reading would leave
"few, if any, state tort actions ... for the saving clause to save. '21 The
Act thus did not expressly preempt Geier's tort claim.
With regard to implied preemption, 22 however, the Court declined
to rely on the formal line drafted by Congress between positive law
and common law. 23 Although the Court recognized that Congress had
constructed the Act to preempt expressly only positive state statutes
and regulations, the Court proceeded to adopt a functional approach
to implied preemption.2 4  Specifically, Justice Breyer held that the
saving clause did not prevent the ordinary operation of implied pre-
emption principles 25 because Congress was unlikely to preclude pre-
emption "where an actual conflict with a federal objective [was] at
stake. ' 26 Certainly, a tension might have existed between the preemp-
tion clause, which furthered uniformity and certainty, and the saving
clause, which favored a retention of state jury control. Nevertheless,
Justice Breyer concluded that "[tihe two provisions, read together, re-
flect a neutral policy" toward conflict preemption. 27 The creation of a
"special burden" against preemption, such as the one suggested by the
dissent, would engender unnecessary complexity, legal uncertainty, and
systemwide costs contrary to the intent of Congress.
28
20 Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1918.
21 Id.
22 Implied preemption breaks down into three essential forms: impossibility, obstacle, and field,
each of which describes the preemptive scope of a statutory or regulatory provision. Impossibility
preemption has an extremely narrow scope, operating only when federal and state law are irrecon-
cilable. See, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (sug-
gesting in dicta that, if federal law prohibited products with greater than seven percent oil content
and California prohibited products with less than eight percent oil content, the situation would
constitute a "physical impossibility"). Obstacle preemption is broader, its purview encompassing
the policies surrounding the federal provision. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(194x) (noting that preemption exists when state law "stands as an obstacle to... the full purposes
and objectives of Congress"). Field preemption is broader still, its sphere enveloping an entire sub-
ject matter. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 2 12 (1983) (holding that "the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear
safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States'). The three forms exist on
a continuum, with impossibility most heavily favoring the concurrent maintenance of state law and
field preemption eliminating state law entirely in favor of an exclusive federal regime. See also
Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2097-98 & fig.i (2000) (de-
scribing the preemption spectrum by the relative presence or absence of congressional action).
23 Geier, 120 S. Ct. at igig.
24 See id. at 1919-2 1.
25 Id. at i919. The Court had left this question unresolved in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 5 14
U.S. 280 (1995). See id. at 287 n.3; see also id. at 288 (holding that, in general, the existence of an
express preemption provision does not by itself foreclose the possibility of implied preemption).
26 Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1920.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 192 1-22.
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Turning to the history of FMVSS 208, Justice Breyer elucidated
why Geier's tort claim presented an obstacle to federal objectives.
2 9
Because the public had opposed passive restraints as a result of safety,
intrusiveness, and cost concerns, the DOT had deliberately rejected a
mandatory "all airbag" standard in favor of a more gradual, flexible
phase-in. 30 The DOT had intended for the gradual phase-in to pro-
mote public acceptance and to enable manufacturers to experiment
with and develop more effective passive restraint systems.
3 1 A state
tort law that required the immediate installation of airbags in all cars
would have obstructed this federal scheme.
32
Justice Stevens dissented.33 With regard to the express preemption
clause, he agreed with the majority that the clause's prohibition of dis-
parate safety standards precluded only positive rules set by state leg-
islatures or agencies, not case-specific common law claims.
3 4 With re-
gard to implied preemption, however, he suggested that the limited
construction of the preemption clause, taken together with the saving
clause, imposed a "special burden" on parties invoking implied conflict
preemption.3S The dissent ultimately concluded that Geier's tort claim
did not present a significant obstacle to federal objectives: The absence
of a ceiling on airbag adoption cast doubt on the importance of a
gradual phase-in. 36 In addition, because of the small risk of tort li-
ability and the considerable time delay in litigation, Justice Stevens
found it highly unlikely that manufacturers would alter their behavior
to comply with uncertain future tort standards.
3 7
Finally, Justice Stevens criticized the Court for ignoring the pre-
sumption against preemption and for imposing its own ideas about tort
reform on the states in violation of federalism principles.
38 Obser-
29 Id. at 1922-26.
30 Id. at 1924.
31 Id. Although Justice Breyer acknowledged that FMVSS 2o8 did not guarantee a gradual
phase-in by setting a "ceiling" on airbag adoption, he noted that considerable resistance by manu-
facturers rendered any threat of excessive airbag adoption minimal. Id.
32 Id. at 1925. Because of the subject's technical nature, the Court also gave weight to the
DOT's longstanding position (as presented in the government's amicus brief) that state tort claims
were contrary to FMVSS 2o8's objectives. Id. at 1926.
33 Justices Souter. Thomas, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion.
34 Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1934 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 1934-35. Although Justice Stevens found that the saving clause "unquestionably
limitled]" preemption and imposed a "special burden," he was reluctant to foreclose implied pre-
emption altogether. Id. at 1935 n.16.
36 Id. at 1937.
37 Id. at 1936-37. Seemingly invoking rule of law values, the majority rebuffed the dissent's
compliance argument, arguing that preemption analysis "assume[s] compliance with the state law
duty in question." Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1926 (emphasis omitted).
38 Id. at 1932, 1938-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1928 ("'This is a case about feder-
alism,' that is, about respect for 'the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities."'
[Vol. 114:179
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vance of the presumption, he argued, was particularly crucial in the
case of agency regulations because agencies, unlike legislatures, lack
the structural safeguards to "defend state interests from undue in-
fringement."39 In light of its failure to address preemption clearly,
FMVSS 2o8 was insufficient to overcome the presumption.
40
The Court's implied preemption analysis in Geier reflects a victory
of function over form. As previously noted, in analyzing preemption
the Court could have easily relied on the distinction between positive
law and common law drawn in the statute's text. The Court never-
theless refused.4 1 Instead, the Court found an ambiguity in the Act's
text and chose a more functional analysis that accounted for its un-
derlying policies. This textual indeterminacy allowed for a new expo-
sition on implied preemption and the presumption against preemption,
as neutral situations are the playground of presumptions.
4 2
Among the various forms of implied preemption 43 Congress has un-
fettered choice, for preemption is ultimately a question of congressional
intent.44 But because Congress did not definitively set forth the pre-
emptive scope of the Act, the Geier Court had to apply some rule of
construction - the presumption against preemption being the most
likely candidate. With the underlying policies of the Act in mind,
however, the Court plainly rejected the presumption. 45 As the dissent
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991); and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713
(1990)).
39 Id. at 1939-40.
40 See id. at 1941.
41 Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-8o (1938) (disregarding the distinction be-
tween positive law and common law). After all, many states have codified their tort laws, and as
the Court recognized in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), a state can regulate
just as effectively through an award of damages as through a positive enactment. Id. at 521. To
rest on this formal distinction would have led to further anomalous results. For example, a line
between positive law and common law would have established a power to frustrate federal policies
in the state courts while eviscerating any such power in the state legislatures. It would have also
created a preference for ex post common law over ex ante. legislation. Such a preference for judi-
cial over legislative policymaking would have been starkly undemocratic.
42 Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, io6o (1975) (suggesting that,
"when no settled rule dictates a decision either way, ... a proper decision could be generated by
either policy or principle").
43 See supra note 22.
44 Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (stating that
the "purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in preemption analysis). Indeed, last year
Congress considered but did not pass legislation that would have set new ground rules for preemp-
tion. See S. 1214, io6th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2245, io6th Cong. (i999).
45 The Court's failure to observe the presumption against preemption is hardly suprising given
its recent "half-hearted" application of the presumption. Nelson, supra note 3, at 298. In addition,
commentators, most notably Professor Nelson, have exposed the presumption's dubious constitu-
tional foundations and questioned its desirability. See, e.g., id. at 29o-303 (arguing that the Su-
premacy Clause's last phrase, "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding," operates as a non obstante clause, which directs courts not to interpret federal
statutes narrowly so as to harmonize them with state law).
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suggested, if a true presumption against preemption existed, the Court
would have been strongly disinclined to find preemption under an am-
biguous statute.4 6 Only when harmonization of state and federal law
was physically impossible would there be a clear (albeit implicit) con-
gressional command to preempt.4 7  The Court's analysis of "obstacle"
preemption was at odds with this presumed "impossibility" approach.
Functionally, impossibility preemption is intractable: it preempts
state law only in rare cases in which an actor cannot comply simulta-
neously with state and federal law.48 Congress - and even adminis-
trative agencies such as the DOT - must operate at some level of
generality; 49 they cannot possibly overturn state law in every niche.
An overzealous application of impossibility preemption would there-
fore allow state courts to frustrate congressional will by setting coun-
tervailing tort standards. Such a regime would also create a one-way
ratchet. Unless made absolutely explicit, congressional attempts to ex-
pand industry discretion or to lower tort standards would fail to pre-
empt state law because actors could technically comply with both fed-
eral and state law by simply adhering to state standards.
The Geier Court's rejection of the presumption against preemption,
however, was predictably not accompanied by a broad expansion of
preemption doctrine toward field preemption. The Court has re-
mained reluctant to find field preemption except when confronted with
pervasive federal regulation. 0 To presume field preemption without
such a limitation would not only drastically alter the balance between
federal and state power, but would also be ill-advised from a practical
standpoint. Establishing federal exclusivity and superseding state tort
law without a viable federal replacement would leave large areas de-
void of legal standards. 1
The Geier Court thus drew a practical compromise by selecting ob-
stacle preemption. Unfortunately, this choice faces its own difficulties.
Because obstacle preemption relies by definition on the "full purposes
46 See Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1934, 1939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
48 Impossibility preemption only occurs when federal law imposes a requirement that conflicts
with a state law prohibition (or vice versa). If federal law only provided a "right," the actor could
comply with both federal and state law by simply refraining from the activity. See, e.g., Barnett
Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996); Nelson, supra note 3, at 228 n.i5.
49 For an interesting discussion of the reasons for limiting a legislature to broad prospective
rules, see Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of At-
tainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 343-48 (1962).
50 See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
51 Moreover, field preemption through the use of overly broad federal prohibitions would unde-
sirably restrict commercial activity. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477-78 (1996)
(describing the necessity of the "grandfathering" provision of the Medical Device Amendments to
permit existing medical devices to remain on the market while the Food and Drug Administration
completed its lengthy review process).
[Vol. 114:179
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and objectives of Congress,"52 its boundaries are somewhat indetermi-
nate. The generality or particularity with which one defines the fed-
eral objectives of a regulation or statute can easily affect its preemp-
tive scope. s3 For example, in Geier, Justice Breyer defined FMVSS
2o8's objective as providing for the "gradual phase-in of passive re-
straints,"5 4 resulting in a broad preemptive scope, whereas Justice
Stevens defined the objective more loosely as enhancing automobile
safety, resulting in a narrower preemptive scope.5 5 Similar difficulties
have plagued other obstacle preemption cases.5 6 Furthermore, the
common formulation of obstacle preemption is vulnerable to the same
criticisms as any judicial attempt to divine legislative purpose.5 7 Fed-
eral agencies, though perhaps more unitary in purpose than Congress,
still consist of multiple actors who often change with each administra-
tion, and even unitary actors often balance multiple and conflicting
purposes.58
In spite of these difficulties, the Court's recent obstacle preemption
jurisprudence suggests the beginnings of a more principled method of
decisionmaking. This method, essentially a federal law preference
rule,59 requires courts to analyze the functional "fit" between a federal
regulatory regime and state tort law - instead of applying a presump-
tion or using formal classifications. Thus, the Court has generally
found preemption in cases in which a federal agency had set a uniform
52 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
53 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1685, 1689-9o (1976) (discussing the functional effects of the relative generality of a given rule).
54 Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1924.
55 Id. at 1937 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56 For example, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), the Court, in construing
the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, declined to find preemption of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion claims because such claims were not narrowly "'based on smoking and health' but rather on a
more general obligation - the duty not to deceive." Id. at 5 28-29 (quoting Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (codified as amended at I5 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1340(0994))). The Court, however, held that the act preempted failure-to-warn claims, id.
at 524, even though the Court could just as easily have construed these claims as the "'more gen-
eral obligation' to inform consumers of known risks," id. at 543 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528-29) (criticizing the plurality's analysis
for its "frequent shift in the level of generality").
57 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2303-04 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the use of statements of individual members of Congress, executive state-
ments, and other legislative history materials to divine legislative intent).
58 See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984) (grappling with the com-
peting policies of promoting nuclear power and protecting public health and safety).
59 See Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the Government
Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 948-57 (1996) (attempting to reconceptualize an
"intermediate version" of federal preemption as utilizing a "choice of law" principle). See generally
Kenneth S. Geller & Alan E. Untereiner, Is There a 'Noncompliance' Exception to Federal Preemp-
tion?, 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 57 (1996) (discussing whether preemption applies when
a defendant fails to satisfy a federal standard).
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standard that adequately 60 replaced state standards.
61  This strong
preference for preemption often leads the Court to impose an exclu-
sively federal standard despite even seemingly contrary statutory pro-
visions. 62  At the same time, the Court has vigorously policed the
boundaries of this decisional rubric - if the federal standard is some-
how infirm, it will not preempt state law.
63
The Court's adoption of a federal law preference rule evinces an
acute awareness of the increasingly borderless American economy.
Considerations of efficiency and practicality often demand a single set
of federal standards to facilitate commercial activity. For example, in
United States v. Locke, 64 also decided last Term, the Court emphasized
the systemic or extraterritorial effects of state law in determining pre-
emption.65  This concern almost certainly informed the Court's deci-
sion in Geier. National manufacturers who sell mobile goods cannot
require them to remain in the place of sale; therefore, manufacturers
cannot effectively customize their goods and price them in accordance
with the tort law of the place of expected use.
66 Varying tort standards
60 As with any legal standard, the definition of "adequate replacement" is not inherently clear,
but reflects a policy choice. Cf Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the scope of proximate cause is a policy determination).
61 See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1093) (interpreting the Federal
Railroad Safety Act to require that federal regulations "substantially subsume" state law in order to
trigger preemption). Incidentally, this "replacement" rule is consistent with Professor Nelson's
"logical-contradiction test," which finds preemption when a state law contradicts a federal rule.
See Nelson, supra note 3, at 26o-6i.
62 For example, in CSX, the Court held that a federal standard preempted a state claim for ex-
cessive train speed despite the Federal Railroad Safety Act's qualified allowance of more stringent
state safety standards. CSX, 507 U.S. at 673-76. The act's provision that allowed more stringent
state standards required that they be compatible with the federal standard and not create "an un-
due burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 662 & n.2. In both Geier and CSX, the Court rejected
arguments that the federal standard represented only a "minimum" on which states could build.
See Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1922; CSX, 507 U.S. at 674.
63 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 5 i8 U.S. 470, 492-94 (1996) (declining to find preemption of
a products liability claim under the Medical Devices Amendments because its "grandfathering"
provision had not imposed any federally enforceable design requirement); Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 514 U.S. 28o, 289 (1995) (refusing to find preemption when the relevant federal standard
had been suspended); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 528-31 (1092) (confining the
preemptive scope of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act to failure-to-warn claims because
the act had only set a standard for cigarette warnings and not for cigarette safety in general).
Compare CSX, 507 U.S. at 671-72 (declining to find preemption of a claim regarding inadequate
railroad crossing devices when federal funds had been diverted to another intersection and thus
federal standards did not apply), with Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 120 S. Ct. 1467, 1476-77
(2000) (finding preemption when a federal agency had approved crossing devices and had provided
funding).
64 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000).
65 See id. at II5O-52; cf Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. II1, 127-28 (1942) (discussing the sys-
temic implications of an individual farmer's otherwise trivially sized wheat crop in the Commerce
Clause context).
66 Stephen F. Williams, Public Choice Theory and the Judiciary: A Review of Jerry L. Mashaw's
Greed, Chaos, and Governance, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599, 1620 (1998).
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thus raise a number of related concerns, many of which have informed
the Court's dormant commerce clause analysis in other contexts.67 If
manufacturers strained to meet the strictest safety standard, a small
minority of states could affect standards nationally and hold all other
states hostage. 68 If manufacturers instead met only an average or me-
dian standard 69 or if conflicting state standards made full compliance
impracticable, 70 then liability-friendly states could effectively "tax"
their more reserved neighbors.71 Tort suits would thus enable parasitic
states to redistribute profits from out-of-state manufacturers to in-state
consumers without internalizing the costs of such suits.72 These prob-
lems are arguably among those that the Framers designed the Consti-
tution to prevent.
73
The Geier Court's intense focus on federal uniformity might appear
to clash with the Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence,7 4
67 The concern about the systemic commercial effects of one state's regulations on the Union as
a whole seems to link inextricably dormant commerce clause and preemption jurisprudence. Dor-
mant commerce clause doctrine, however, more closely resembles field preemption than the federal
law preference rule because it "preempts" and overrides state law even when no federal standard
exists, thus resulting in areas devoid of regulation. See generally Dinh, supra note 22, at 2 109-12
(discussing the relationship between the dormant commerce clause and preemption doctrines).
68 Cf. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (198i) (striking down a state
statute limiting the use of certain trucks as an impermissible burden on interstate commercial traf-
fic).
69 In actuality, manufacturers are unlikely either to satisfy multiple standards through customi-
zation or to conform to the strictest standard. To maximize efficiency and economies of scale, they
will observe only one average level of care that minimizes both compliance costs and litigation
costs. David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 428-29 (2ooo).
70 Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 527-30 (0959) (striking down, on dor-
mant commerce clause grounds, an Illinois statute requiring contoured mudguards that conflicted
with an Arkansas statute forbidding such mudguards).
71 Cf. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (i994) ("The paradigmatic example of
a law discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective tariff or customs duty, which
taxes goods imported from other States, but does not tax similar products produced in State.').
72 See Williams, supra note 66, at 162o. For an alternative, non-preemptive solution to the re-
distribution problem that preserves state variation, see William A. Niskanen, Do Not Federalize
Tort Law: A Friendly Response to Senator Abraham, i MICH L. & POL'y REv. io5 (I996), which
proposes a federal choice-of-law rule that applies the law of the state in which the majority of the
manufacturer's employees work. See id. at io9.
73 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 214-15 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987) (discussing
the evils of import and export duties among the several states). Indeed, some commentators sug-
gest that a system of differing regulations might actually give a competitive advantage to intrastate
firms. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL REGULATION: THE CASE OF
PRODUCT LABELING 3 (Wash. Legal Fou-nd.Working Paper, i99i).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, i2o S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2000) (holding that gender-
motivated crimes do not fall under the Commerce Clause power); United States v. Lopez, 5 14 U.S.
549, 567 (I995) (holding that gun possession in a school zone is insufficiently connected with eco-
nomic activity to implicate the Commerce Clause).
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which has sought to return more power to the states.
75  A careful
analysis of the Court's federalism and preemption jurisprudence, how-
ever, reveals no such conflict. The Court's federalism cases, which
have principally addressed "immobile" concerns, such as social and
criminal legislation, are far more susceptible to states' rights argu-
ments. 76 Such legislation generally affects only the limited geographic
area in which it applies, enabling local governments to emphasize dif-
fering regional values without systemic or national effects. There, the
Brandeisian concept of the states as experimental laboratories
77 is not
only plausible, but also preferable. By contrast, the Court's preemp-
tion cases, which have principally involved mobile products, represent
situations in which inconsistent state regulations could have significant
(and likely detrimental) systemic effects.
Beyond its federalism ramifications, Geier's federal law preference
rule also suggests a preference for ex ante determinations of reasonable
care by expert agencies over ex post ones by lay juries. Federal agen-
cies are arguably far more institutionally competent than are juries in
performing the complex cost-benefit analyses necessary in modern
products liability law, which involve not only compensation and deter-
rence, but also broader policy questions such as job creation and for-
eign relations.78 As a consequence of Geier and other recent preemp-
tion cases, federally imposed agency rules regarding due care have
replaced the vague standards of reasonableness that have traditionally
characterized tort law. Lay juries are still used for their unique com-
petency in determining case-specific facts, but agency rulemaking has
considerably reined in jury discretion in establishing standards of be-
havior. This triumph of experts over laity may be a matter of concern,
particularly for consumer advocacy groups that believe that federal
agencies succumb to industry pressure.
79 In the end, consumers may
be left only with the hope that journalists and watchdog groups will
provide a sufficient counterbalance to the influence of industry.
In summary, Geier, in conformity with the Court's recent preemp-
tion jurisprudence, reflects a gradual shift away from the traditional
75 See, e.g., Michael Greve, Collision Court: Upcoming Clash Between Federalism and Pre-
emption Is Foretold in the Geier v. American Honda Opinions, LEGAL TIMES, June i2, 2000, at 74.
76 Another distinguishing factor is that the Court's federalism cases patrol the constitutional
boundaries of Congress's power, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177-78 (18o3),
whereas the preemption cases only apply the Supremacy Clause in areas in which Congress's
power is already well established.
77 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
78 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing institutional competence).
79 See, e.g., Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with
Federal Standards, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415,435,457 (1996).
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